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L.: Attorney and Client--Effective Representation--Federal Procedure

CASE COMMENTS
ATEORNEY

AND

CLIENT-EFFECTIVE REPREENTATIoN-FEDERAL

PIlocEnUw.-D was indicted for possession, removal and conceal-

ment of nontax-paid whiskey. In the presence of an atto-ney of

his own choice D pleaded guilty and was sentenced. Having served
one year of his sentence, he sought to have it set aside under 28

U.S.C. § 2255 (1952). Held, inter alia, an allegation that D was
tricked by his attorney is not a proper matter to be raised by a
statutory motion to vacate sentence. United States v. Busch, 135
F. Supp. 3 (S.D. W. Va. 1955) Other parts of the decision are
not within the scope of this comment.
For its proposition of law the court relied on Crowe v. United
States, 175 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1949). There, under very similar
facts, the defendant had the aid of three attorneys of his own choice,
and he alleged that only one of them had committed fraud. It might
be reasoned that under such facts the defendant's rights were still
properly protected by two of his attorneys. Under defendant's allegations in the case at hand there was no protection whatsoever.
Does denial of relief hinge on the fact that in both cases counsel
were of defendant's own selection, rather than court-appointed?
According to some cases there is a legal basis for such a distinction.
It is reasoned that lack of skill or incompetence of counsel employed
by the defendant can be imputed to the defendant by reason of
his voluntary selection, unless he repudiates his attorney's conduct
by making known to the court his objection. Hendrickson v. Overlade, 131 F. Supp. 561 (N.D. Ind. 1955); United States ex rel.
Darcy v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407 (3rd Cir. 1953). The court can not
rely on such reasoning when the defendant's attorney is courtappointed.
However, due to the presumption that an attorney selected
by the court was selected with due regard for the defendant's constitutional rights, Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir. 1945),
the inference must follow that a court-appointed attorney stands
on a plane with one of defendant's own selection. As to both, mere
allegations of negligence or ignorance will not suffice in an effort
to have a sentence set aside for lack of proper representation. An
attorney appointed to represent the defendant admittedly may give
improper and bad advice, but so may counsel of defendant's own
choice. Therefore, unless the defendant represented by court-appointed counsel can override the presumption that the court ap-
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pointed a reputable member of the bar, and used care and due
regard for the defendant's constitutional rights, no issue under the
sixth amendment, guaranteeing the assistance of counsel, has been
raised. Diggs v. Welch, supra at 668.
It follows, that in order to obtain relief on the ground of fraud
or incompetence of counsel, irrespective of who selected him, the
defendant must proceed on the basis of the fifth amendment to the
Federal Constitution, guaranteeing a fair trial under the due process clause. What, then, is the standard under the due process
clause?
It would seem that a fair trial is lacking only in the absence
of "effective" representation, meaning representation so lacking in
competence that it becomes the duty of the court or prosecution to
correct it. Diggs v. Welch, supra at 670. To prevail in a case of
this nature, the defendant must show an extreme case of fraud or
negligence by his attorney, amounting to a "farce and mockery of
justice", United States v. Wright, 176 F.2d 376, 379 (2d Cir. 1949),
or a "travesty on justice", as stated in Hendricksonv. Overlade, supra
at 563. Thus, it would seem that in a proper case for application
of the due process clause, not only must there be extreme negligence
on the part of the defense counsel, which some courts impute to
the defendant himself, but extreme negligence on the part of the
court and the prosecution as well. United States ex rel. Darcy v.
Handy, supra at 427.
When a rare case does approach the point of being reversible
as a "farce and mockery of justice," the courts tend to consider
strongly the intelligence of the defendant. Where the defendant
is intelligent and had some prior experience with court proceedings, he should bear some responsibility, as in the case of Tompsett
v. Ohio, 146 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1945), where the defendant's attorney
failed to attend a preliminary hearing some time before the trial
and the defendant did not discharge him. But where the defendant
is of low intelligence and ignorant of his rights, he may safely
depend wholly upon his attorney. Hillman v. State, 123 N.E.2d
180 (Ind. 1954). Thus he may rely more strongly on the court
for his protection.
In summary, relief does not depend on who appointed counsel,
but on the degree to which the defendant's constitutional right to
a fair trial has been infringed. According to the principal case a
mere allegation that the defendant's attorney misled him is not
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sufficient for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1952). This rule stands
without exception. However, stronger allegations might, in a proper
case, bring § 2255 into play. Thus, Jones v. Huff, 152 F.2d 14 (D.
C. Cir. 1945), allowed a hearing under § 2255. There numerous
obvious errors had been committed by the defendant's counsel, e.g.,
he had failed to object to admission in evidence of an involuntary
confession, to call witnesses who would have established the defendant's innocence, to offer a relevant defense and to take steps to
obtain an examination of handwritings in a forgery case. See Adams
v. United States, 222 F.2d 45 (D. C. Cir. 1955) where the defendant's criticism of his attorney was made at the time of sentencing
in the presence of the court, but the petition was denied, since
the trial court had had an opportunity to decide the issue at that
time.

The courts lay down two general reasons for this strict standard.
One is that they do not want to open a 'Pandora's box of accusations" for every person convicted of a crime and sentenced. United
States v. Malfetti, 125 F. Supp. 27, 80 (D.N.J. 1954). "If the test
to be applied depended upon the skill with which a defendant was
represented, there would never be any finality to a trial." Miller v.
Hudspeth, 176 F.2d 111 (10th Cir. 1949). The other and closely
related reason, is that the courts do not think they should use "hindsight", or "second guessing", in determining if trial strategy had
been good or bad. Hillman v. State, supra at 188, dissenting opinion.
In the principal case the court indicated that the defendant's
allegations of trickery should have been asserted in the trial court
and by appeal. But it would seem that the defendant would not
be able to present a case reversible under due process, whether on
appeal or by habeas corpus, or under § 2255, since the substantive
test for denial of due process does not appear to have been met.
The defendant still would be denied the relief he sought. It is little
consolation to the defendant to advise him that his mistake was
only procedural, when it was substantive as well.
G. T. L.
CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW - Cours-MA TIAL - JUIusDICTION OVER

'Ex-SERvIcE m_. - Five months after being honorably discharged
from the Air Force, a former serviceman was arrested by military
authorities on a charge of murder committed while serving as an
airman in Korea. He was taken to Korea to stand trial under au-
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